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ABSTRACT 
 
In this research report, I address the question: “What is the proper sphere of 
influence of a corporation in relation to its moral obligations to support and 
respect human rights?” 
 
I take for granted that corporations have positive duties to help protect human 
rights. Referring to recent reports on sphere of influence by the UN Special 
Representative, I consider the question of whom it is that a corporation is obliged 
to help. I assert that the predominant spatial metaphor provides an implausible 
account of sphere of influence and propose an alternative approach, adopting 
principles of respect for the freedom and autonomy of others, with specific 
reference to a corporation’s concrete set of social, economic, political and 
historical relations with other actors.  
 
I attempt to demonstrate that the proposed approach more plausibly defines the 
beneficiaries of a duty to aid in relation to human rights than either a spatial 
metaphor or the Special Representative’s principle of a duty to respect human 
rights.  
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Introduction 
 
Twenty years ago, in one of the first works to explore business ethics in a global 
environment, Thomas Donaldson proposed a set of human rights standards that 
he suggested were morally binding on multi-national enterprises (MNE’s).1 The 
idea was controversial - one of the theories of business ethics predominant then 
denied that business had any social responsibility other than maximising profits 
for the benefit of stockholders, without harming others or violating negative 
duties.2 Nowadays, the idea that MNE’s are positively obligated to others in 
relation to human rights is less contentious.3 There also appears to be broad 
consensus on a moral currency common to corporations and other actors, 
including governments, in the form of key international human rights instruments.  
For example, over 100 major corporations specifically acknowledge the Universal 
                                                 
1
 Donaldson, T., The Ethics of International Business (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). Donaldson’s minima include freedom of association, free 
speech, physical security, non-discrimination and rights to property and 
movement. 
2
 At the time, the leading exponent of stockholder theory was Milton Friedman - 
see Friedman, Milton, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits”, New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970.  
3
 There is a vast literature on this topic. See, for example, Bowie, Norman E., 
“Relativism and the Moral Obligations of Multi-national Corporations,” in Tom L. 
Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie, eds., Ethical Theory and Business, 7th ed., 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004), p. 538, and Leisinger, 
Klaus M., “On Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights”, (Basel, April 2006), 
accessed at htpp://www.reports-and-materials.org/Leisinger-on-Corporate-
Responsibility -for-Human- Rights. 
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Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) as a benchmark for corporate conduct. 4 
In a recent and significant development, over 4700 corporations have committed 
themselves to observe the principles established by the UN Global Compact.5 
The Global Compact was launched in July 2000, and invites subscribing 
enterprises voluntarily to comply with 10 principles in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and corruption. The Compact asks 
corporations, within their sphere of influence, to support and respect the 
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights and not to be complicit in 
human rights abuses.6  
 
The human rights instruments that form the basis of the Compact were, of course, 
conceived as legal obligations enforceable by citizens against the state.. The 
words “sphere of influence” acknowledge a discrete realm of responsibility for 
corporations, and thus recognise that governments remain responsible to support 
and respect human rights, and to sanction those who commit human rights 
abuses. But the concept of  sphere of influence also does the work of the 
defining the scope of a corporation’s positive obligation to support and respect 
human rights, both in relation to the human rights impact of its business activities 
and in responding to human rights abuses by others.  
                                                 
4
 Chandler, G., “Business and Human Rights: Reflections on Progress made and 
Challenges Ahead”, address to Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 
London, 4 December 2007, accessed at htpp://www.business-
humanrights/org/Documents/Chandler4Dec2007. 
5
 UN Global Compact, accessed at www.unglobalcompact.org. 
htpp://www.unglobalcompact.org./AboutTheGC/index.html 
6
 Principle I of the Global Compact. 
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The most recent attempt to give content to the concept of sphere of influence is 
John Ruggie’s project, undertaken under the auspices of the UN. Ruggie was 
appointed to identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility with regard 
to human rights, and also to research and clarify the implications for transnational 
corporations of the concept of sphere of influence.7  Kofi Annan, then General-
Secretary of the UN, appointed Ruggie as a Special Representative following an 
impasse in discussions on the draft Norms, a proposed set of human rights 
standards that sought to impose legal obligations on corporations.8 The scope of 
Ruggie’s work extended beyond the legal realm to include sources of corporate 
responsibility (i.e. the role of social norms, moral considerations and strategic 
behaviour),9 and his observations and conclusions are therefore relevant to any 
attempt to define a proper sphere of influence in relation to a corporation’s moral 
obligations to support and respect human rights. 
 
                                                 
7
 United Nations General Assembly document A/HRC/4/035 (9 February 2007) 
“Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transactional Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises”, referred to as “Ruggie Final Report”. 
8
 The Norms, adopting the language of the Global Compact, required 
corporations, within their sphere of influence, to support and respect human 
rights, on threat of legal sanction. See United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, Commission on Human rights, sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, document E/CN.4?Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (adopted 
13 August 2003) “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights”. 
9
 Remarks by John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights seminar, Old 
Billingsgate, London, 8 December 2005, accessed at htpp://www.business-
humanrights.org/Links/Repository/987023. 
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 Ruggie ultimately concludes that the concept of sphere of influence is 
implausible. Instead, he proposes  the idea of a “scope of due diligence” to 
demarcate responsibilities around the principles “protect, respect and remedy” – 
i.e., the state’s duty to protect human rights against abuses by others, corporate 
responsibility to respect  human rights, and the need for more effective access to 
remedies.10 The scope of due diligence (and in particular the scope of a principle 
of respect) is not clear as to whom a corporation is obligated to aid, but appears 
to limit the category of beneficiaries to those with whom the corporation has 
some form of contractual tie, or who are related by geographic proximity. 
 
The observations that Ruggie makes in relation to the concept of sphere of 
influence, if only to point out its limitations, have implications for any 
consideration of the moral scope of corporate obligation in relation to human 
rights. Not least, corporations that subscribe to the Global Compact ought to 
understand the nature and extent of the obligations incurred by them, 
establishing, as the Compact does, obligations within the sphere of influence. 
  
In this paper, I consider the concept of sphere of influence from a business ethics 
perspective. I take for granted that a proper sphere of influence supports both 
constraints that are both negative (requiring corporations to refrain from harming 
others) and goals that are positive, requiring corporations to help protect human 
                                                 
10
 Ruggie Final Report, at paragraph 9. 
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rights. The content of a positive duty to aid incorporates, amongst others,11 the 
question of who should be the beneficiaries of aid.  I agree with Ruggie that the 
value of the prevailing spatial metaphor for sphere of influence is implausible: it 
assumes a priori a set of relationships, a defined distance between the 
corporation and the stakeholder concerned, and an orderly diminishing of 
obligation from one relationship to the next.12 The spatial metaphor thus fails 
plausibly to specify the content of a corporation’s positive obligation with regard 
to whom should be the object of aid. The thesis I defend is that sphere of 
influence, with respect to Richard Lippke’s account of moral responsibility,13 
accounts for the relationships that define the beneficiaries of a duty to aid. 
 
First, in part one, I set out the background to a consideration of an MNE’s proper 
sphere of influence in relation to human rights. In part two, I present two 
arguments: first, I spell out why the predominant spatial model of sphere of 
influence is implausible; secondly, I argue that Ruggie’s principle of respect (an 
integral component of the scope of due diligence) similarly fails to account for 
whom should be the beneficiaries of a duty to aid. To establish a conceptual 
basis for my assertions on the nature and extent of an MNE’s obligations in 
relation to human rights, I then explore the scope of corporate moral obligation in 
                                                 
11
 Other questions might include, for example, how much a positive duty to aid 
requires of a corporation, and what it obligates a corporation to do. 
12
 These arguments are drawn from Reader, Soran, “Distance, Relationship and 
Moral Obligation”, The Monist 86 (2003): 367-381. 
13
 Lippke, Richard L., “Setting the Terms of the Business Responsibility Debate”, 
Social Theory and Practice 11 (1985): 355-370. 
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relation to whom one has a duty to aid.  I draw on Lippke’s social niche approach 
(SNA) to support the arguments that I develop in part three. The SNA disavows 
any abstract conception of persons in attempting to define their moral 
responsibilities and suggests instead that each person has a social niche, in the 
form of a set of concrete social, economic, political and historical relations to 
other persons that tailors moral responsibilities. 14 I argue that these ideas, linking 
as they do relationship, power and ability, provide an appropriate basis for 
establishing a typology regarding situations in which corporations are obligated to 
act positively to support and respect human rights and in particular, to determine 
the beneficiaries of the duty to aid.  
 
In part three, I apply Reader’s relationship-based account of obligation and the 
SNA to the concept of sphere of influence, and consider how a corporation’s 
relationships and social niche might operate to determine the beneficiaries of a 
duty to aid. Finally, in part four, I consider briefly the objections that the 
conception of sphere of influence that I advance imposes inappropriate and 
unduly onerous burdens on corporations and whether relationship should really 
matter in determining whom to aid.  I reply to these objections before concluding 
the paper. 
 
In developing my argument, I make a number of assumptions about the nature 
and extent of corporate entities. Specifically, I assume that corporations 
                                                 
14
 Ibid at p.360. 
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themselves (i.e. as distinct from their individual members or certain of them) have 
moral personality and that they constitute moral agents. I also assume that as 
moral agents, corporations have moral obligations in relation to basic human 
rights (such as those referred to in the Global Compact) in respect of a defined 
category of recipient, that the definition of this category is itself a moral issue and 
that corporations are morally accountable for the effects of their actions.15 The 
concept of complicity, in terms of which a corporation might within its sphere of 
influence be held accountable or share responsibility with third parties for any 
human rights abuses, is beyond the scope of this paper. To be clear, I am also 
not concerned with the Global Compact or any other instrument and its relation to 
international law. The extent to which private actors (and corporations in 
particular) are subject to international law obligations in relation to human rights 
on the basis of its actions, omissions and complicity with others is a separate, 
extensive and controversial debate. 16 
                                                 
15
 These are obviously not uncontested propositions. For a review of the debate 
on the moral agency of corporations, see Werhane, Patricia H. and Freeman, R. 
Edward, “Business Ethics”, in. Frey, R.G. and Wellman, Christopher Heath, eds., 
A Companion to Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005): 537-551.  
16
 The legal obligation of corporations in relation to human rights and the 
enforcement of those obligations is the subject of a number of recent cases, 
notably Doe v Unocal 41 ILM 1367 (2002), and closer to home, Lubbe v Cape 
Plc  [2000] 4 All ER 268. In the latter case, the House of Lords sanctioned the 
bringing of a personal injury claim in the United Kingdom by a group of 
employees who claimed damages because of their exposure to asbestos and 
asbestos related products while employed in the company’s operations in South 
Africa. In Unocal, an American court held that corporations could be directly 
liable for certain actions e.g. genocide, slavery and war crimes, without there 
being any need for state action. See  Bilchitz, David,  “Project on Business and 
Human Rights: Baseline Report”, prepared by the South African Institute for 
Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights & International Law 
(Johannesburg: 2008),  for a comprehensive overview of the legal debate and 
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1. 
 
The rise of the MNE is the most visible manifestation of globalisation - estimates 
are that some 70 000 corporations, with 700 000 subsidiaries and millions of 
suppliers, span the globe.17 The economic transformation that globalisation has 
brought about has focused attention on the economic power and influence that 
MNE’s exercise and on the public role that they play. MNE’s have the capacity to 
take actions that harm persons and have resources in excess of what some 
national states hold.  Klaus Schwab recently identified the factors at play in the 
era of the shrinking of state power and the widening of the sphere of influence of 
business: 
 
The intensified pace of globalization due to advances in technology is the 
most significant factor in the weakening influence of the state. Fast 
transportation links and the speedy flow of information have negated the 
relevance of geographic borders. Whether it is poverty in Africa or the 
haze over Southeast Asia, an increasing number of problems require 
                                                                                                                                                 
the application of the South African Constitution to the question of an MNE’s 
liability for human rights abuses in national and international law. 
17
 United Nations General Assembly document A/HRC/4/035 (22 February 2006) 
“Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transactional Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises”, referred to as “Ruggie Interim Report”, at paragraph 11.   
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bilateral, regional, or global solutions and, in many cases, the mobilization 
of more resources than any single government can marshal.18 
 
Schwab suggests that corporations have become integral to the survival of 
governments and the political stability of nations and regions. As a consequence 
of the decline in state power and the sharp rise in the influence of corporations 
on communities, communities and citizens increasingly look to corporations with 
“requests for help and criticism for wrongdoing”.19 This is particularly so in those 
areas where MNE’s conduct business in an environment that might be hostile to 
commercial operations, for example, in weak governance zones. 
  
MNE’s face the challenge to conduct business operations consistent with 
internationally accepted norms relating to human rights. The tensions and trends 
that underlie this challenge, particularly acute since the 1990’s, are well 
described by Tom Sorell. He argues that states are not the only protectors and 
violators of human rights. In the category of protectors of human rights, 
campaigning NGO’s and others play a significant role. In the category of human 
rights violators, one might encounter warlords, political organisations and 
traffickers in people and drugs.20 Businesses, Sorell suggests, arguably belong to 
both categories, i.e., human rights respecting non-state actors and human rights 
                                                 
18
 Schwab Klaus., “Corporate Global Citizenship”, Foreign Affairs 87 (2008): 107 
– 118.  
19
 Ibid, at p.109. 
20
 Sorell T., “Business and Human Rights”, in Campbell, T. and Miller, S., (eds)., 
Human Rights and the Moral Responsibility of Corporate and Public Sector 
Organisations (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer, 2004). 
 14 
violating non-state actors. As the concentration of moral responsibility in the state 
has waned and obligations in relation to human rights have increasingly been 
ascribed to non-state actors (including corporations), international human rights 
instruments have assumed the status of a moral benchmark for the conduct of 
business. 21 Tom Campbell makes this point particularly powerfully:  
 
Human rights have come to represent the moral dimension of globalisation: 
the affirmation of universal standards to which we can look for guidance 
for the humanisation of capitalism, the revitalisation of democratic control 
and the protection of the values that give meaning and importance to life. 
More particularly, in their affirmation of the equal worth and supreme value 
of every human being, human rights set the parameters and goals for any 
legitimate human organisation. It therefore seems appropriate to see 
human rights as a source of ideas for determining the normative ordering 
of global capitalism and its governmental structures.22 
 
Governments are clearly required to respect and enforce human rights standards 
within the limits of their legal jurisdiction.  But if internationally proclaimed human 
rights standards are to serve as norms for the conduct of business in a global 
market (as I maintain they are), and corporations (unlike governments) have 
                                                 
21
 Ibid, at p. 136. 
22
 Campbell T., “Moral Dimensions of Human Rights”, in Campbell, T. and Miller, 
S., eds., (supra), at p.11. 
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neither defined territorial jurisdiction nor citizens, to whom do they owe a positive 
duty to aid? 
   
The Global Compact does not spell out the nature and extent of the scope of 
corporate responsibility - it calls on corporations to “embrace, support and enact, 
within their sphere of influence a set of core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption”. 23 Neither the Global 
Compact, nor any other international human rights instrument, defines “sphere of 
influence”; it was left to Ruggie to research and bring some definition and 
meaning to the concept.  
 
In his interim report tabled in February 2006, Ruggie notes that the concept of 
sphere of influence has “productive practical applicability” especially as far as 
company policies are concerned, but that its meaning remains elusive.24 In his 
final report, submitted in April 2008, Ruggie presents an alternative conceptual 
and policy framework to anchor the debate on corporate obligations in relation to 
                                                 
23
 This wording is mirrored in the ill-fated Draft Norms adopted by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in August 2003, see United Nations Economic 
and Social Council, Commission on Human rights, sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, document 
E/CN.4?Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (adopted 13 August 2003) “Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises with regard to human rights”. The Norms represent 
the first non-voluntary initiative to establish responsibilities on the part of MNE’s 
in relation to human rights. The Draft Norms required that “within their respective 
spheres of activity and influence”, MNE’s had the obligation to promote, secure 
the fulfilment of, respect, and ensure respect of human rights recognised in 
international as well as national law (see paragraph A of the Norms). 
24
 Ruggie Interim Report, at paragraph 67.  
 16 
human rights. The framework comprises three principles: the duty of the state to 
protect against human rights abuses by other actors, including business; the 
responsibility of corporations to respect human rights; and the need for effective 
access to remedies by victims of human rights abuse. 25  
 
In relation to the second principle (the principle with which this paper is 
concerned) Ruggie asserts that to respect rights essentially means not to infringe 
on the rights of others, or, put another way, to do no harm.26 Although some 
companies may have additional responsibilities, e.g., if they perform public 
functions or voluntarily undertake additional commitments, “the responsibility to 
respect is the baseline expectation of companies in all situations.”27 Ruggie 
acknowledges that the requirement to do no harm may entail positive steps but 
he regards these obligations as limited and, it would seem, admits only those 
positive duties necessary to discharge negative obligations.28 For example, an 
obligation not to deprive workers of a safe and healthy work environment 
necessarily entails that a corporation take positive steps to ensure that protective 
clothing and safety-related training are provided.  
 
Critical to the notion of the responsibility to respect human rights is the concept of 
due diligence. Here, Ruggie refers to the process in terms of which corporations 
                                                 
25
 Ruggie Final Report, at paragraph 9.  
26
 Ibid, at paragraph 24.  
27
 Ibid, at paragraph 54. 
28
 Ibid, at paragraph 55. 
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become aware of, prevent and address human rights impacts.29 The scope of the 
due diligence process, Ruggie suggests, should be determined by three sets of 
factors. The first is the “country context” in which business activities take place; 
this may serve to highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose. 
So, for example, a corporation deciding to invest in West Africa will be faced with 
more immediate and obvious human rights challenges than an investment in 
Western Europe. The second factor is the human rights impacts of a 
corporation’s activities within a specific country context. Here, Ruggie refers to 
the impacts of a corporation’s own activities – as producers, service providers, 
employers and neighbours. The third factor is the prospect of a corporation 
contributing to human rights abuse through relationships connected to its 
activities, e.g., relationships with business partners, suppliers and state agencies 
and other non-state actors.30 How far or how deep this due diligence process 
must go, Ruggie asserts, “will depend on the circumstances”.31  
 
In relation to sphere of influence more specifically, Ruggie notes that the concept 
of sphere of influence was introduced into human rights discourse as a spatial 
metaphor, expressed in concentric circles with the company’s operations at the 
core, moving outward, with the assumption that influence (and therefore 
responsibility) declines from one circle to the next.  Ruggie regards this as a 
useful model to identify opportunities to support human rights beyond the 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, at paragraph 57. 
30
 Ibid, at paragraph 57. 
31
 Ibid. 
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workplace, but argues that a more rigorous approach is required “to define the 
parameters of the responsibility to respect and its due diligence component.”32  
Ruggie’s conclusion (i.e. that the spatial model of sphere of influence is 
implausible) is easily justified, as I shall demonstrate in the next part. 
 
Ruggie then asserts that influence as impact (a situation where an MNE’s 
activities directly or indirectly cause harm) falls squarely within the responsibility 
to respect human rights, but that any obligation to exercise influence as leverage 
(i.e. influence a corporation may have over other actors) is limited, if it exists at 
all. Specifically, Ruggie stipulates that corporations are not required to act 
whenever they have influence, especially over governments.33 
 
Ruggie objects to any responsibility to respect human rights being anchored in 
the concept of “influence as leverage” on the basis that to do so would hold 
corporations responsible for the human rights impacts of every entity over which 
they may have some influence, including cases where the corporation was not a 
causal agent, neither directly or indirectly causing the harm in question.34 Nor is it 
desirable, Ruggie argues, to have companies act whenever they have influence, 
especially over governments – to do so would imply that “can implies ought”:  
 
                                                 
32
 Ibid, at paragraph 67. 
33
 Ibid, at paragraph 69.  
34
 Ibid. 
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[A]sking companies to support human rights voluntarily where they have 
influence is one thing; but attaching responsibility to them on that basis is 
another.35 
 
Ruggie’s conclusion (i.e., that the scope of due diligence required to meet 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights is neither a fixed sphere nor 
based on influence but is dependent rather on impacts resulting from business 
activities and relationships)36 seriously calls into question the value of the 
concept of “sphere of influence” in relation to human rights obligations. But 
Ruggie’s alternative model, the scope of due diligence (including the obligation to 
respect human rights) fails clearly to address whom a corporation might be 
obligated to aid, beyond those it has harmed or promised to help.  
 
The concrete challenges that the concept of sphere of influence poses for 
corporations are well articulated by Klaus Leisinger, who in his recent paper on 
corporate responsibility for human rights, poses the following questions: 
 
But where exactly a company’s “sphere of influence” begins and where it 
ends remains a subject of controversy. Does it refer “only” to the areas 
behind the factory fence, as this is the area where a company is fully able 
to apply its corporate rules and regulations? Do the company’s business 
partners and suppliers also fall within this sphere? And what about the 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid, at paragraph 72. 
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communities in which the company operates or from which it recruits its 
employees? Does even the entire host country fall within this sphere, 
because one could argue that those who pay taxes in a country where 
human rights are abused are providing support to those directly 
responsible? … Ultimately, such questions have to be answered by the 
company itself.37 
 
These questions may conceal a lack of clarity about what the sphere of influence 
is – they suggest that sphere of influence at once constitutes both a universe 
within which a corporation’s moral responsibility extends in the sense of being 
responsible for the acts of others (e.g., its suppliers) and whom a corporation 
might itself be obligated to aid (e.g., local communities). In the next two parts, I 
develop the argument that the work properly done by sphere of influence is to 
give content to the positive obligation to protect human rights, and in particular, to 
define the beneficiaries of this duty.  
 
2. 
 
In this part, I argue that both the prevailing spatial metaphor of sphere of 
influence and Ruggie’s principle of respect are implausible accounts of sphere of 
influence, and then lay the conceptual foundation for an alternative approach 
                                                 
37
 Leisinger, Klaus M., “On Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights”, (Basel, 
April 2006), available at www.reports-and-materials.org/Leisinger-on-Corporate-
Responsibility-for-Human- Rights, at p.13.  
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based on relationships that are the subject of a capacity to make decisions that 
affect the freedom and autonomy of others.  
 
Current interpretations proffered by the UN supervisory bodies and others for 
sphere of influence locate the concept in a spatial metaphor depicting a series of 
concentric circles, each representing a particular relationship, the assumption 
being that influence (and therefore responsibility ) declines as one moves 
outward from one circle to the next, i.e., from the core to the periphery. The 
Briefing Paper prepared jointly by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Global Compact and Business Leaders Initiative on Human 
Rights, referring specifically to the Global Compact, states: 
 
Understanding a company’s sphere of influence can be accomplished by 
mapping the stakeholder groups affected by a business’ operations. A key 
stakeholder group that will normally lie at the centre of any company’s 
sphere of influence will be employees. Other groups, such as business 
partners, suppliers, trade unions, local communities, and customers will 
follow. The final group will usually be government and the wider society.38 
 
The predominance of the spatial metaphor of sphere of influence is apparent 
from the advice of the Office of the Global Compact itself. The Office 
                                                 
38
 “Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business Management”, a joint 
publication of BLIHR, UN Global Compact Office and the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, (Geneva: May 2006), at p.4. 
 22 
acknowledges that some corporations may wish to increase their leverage or 
sphere of influence by collaborating with other actors, and suggests: 
 
The concept of “sphere of influence” can help map the scope of a 
company’s opportunities to support human rights and make the greatest 
positive impact. While these opportunities may be greatest with respect to 
a company’s own operations and workers, the ability to act gradually 
declines as consideration moves outward to the supply chain, to local 
communities, and beyond.39 
 
Sphere of influence presented thus as a spatial metaphor ought to be familiar to 
stakeholder theorists, who typically identify shareholders, employees, suppliers, 
customers, local communities as persons having a stake in the corporation,40 
often crafting similar models of concentric circles to indicate those relationships 
closest to the core of the business and those more far removed. It should not be 
surprising then that this model has been adapted on a large scale by 
corporations seeking a conception of how to promote human rights practices 
beyond the workplace itself. In his interim report, Ruggie notes that nine out of 
ten respondents in a survey that he conducted of the Fortune Global 500 (the 
world’s largest corporations) reported that their human rights policies 
                                                 
39
 United Nations Global Compact “The Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and other Business Enterprises”,  accessed at 
htpp://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/human_rights 
40
 Rossouw, Deon, with Van Vuuren, Leon, Business Ethics, 3rd ed., (Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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encompassed suppliers, contractors, distributors, joint venture partners and 
others in the value chain.41 
 
The difference of course, is that in stakeholder theory, the spatial model indicates 
whom should be regarded as stakeholders, and what relative weight should be 
attached to their respective interests and claims on the corporation. In relation to 
sphere of influence, the spatial model is used variously to identify those 
relationships that are morally obligating, the intensity of that obligation, those 
actors on whom influence can be brought to bear for human rights-related 
purposes, and the beneficiaries of a duty to aid.   
 
This risk of conceptual confusion aside, Ruggie’s observation that sphere of 
influence as a spatial metaphor has limited value is easily justified. The metaphor 
assumes that influence and therefore the intensity of obligation is necessarily 
directly related to proximity. The problem with this conception of sphere of 
influence is well captured by Reader, who in the context of her discussion on 
impartialism and the problem of distance, offers the following objection: 
 
The “expanding circle of sympathy” picture of relationship and obligation is 
sometimes used by partialists in an attempt to deal with the problem of 
distance …Intuitive circles start with the family and shade outwards to the 
whole universe, with relationships like colleague, comrade, citizen, fellow 
                                                 
41
 Ruggie Interim Report, at paragraph 36. 
 24 
resident of temperate Europe, fellow resident of the biosphere, 
determining progressively weaker moral obligations in between. The 
problem with this kind of view is that obligations do not seem to diminish in 
any orderly way that can be captured a priori… Obligations can be 
powerful even in rudimentary relationships like encounters. When needing 
others loom large here and now, they place considerable moral obligations 
on an agent.42 
 
The analogy with business activities is obvious. The range of proper beneficiaries 
of aid should not be pre-defined in relation to a corporation’s “centre”, their needs 
and the powerfulness of obligations to them is not fixed by particular business 
activities or relationships, nor do they necessarily diminish incrementally from the 
core to the periphery of a corporation’s business activities. The needs of a local 
community in which a corporation has business operations who are without 
access to an adequate standard of living will, for example, inevitably be greater 
than those of well-heeled employees from corporate headquarters. Intuitively, the 
claims of the more distant local community on the corporation would therefore be 
greater than those of the employees.  
 
Ruggie is therefore correct to regard the spatial metaphor of sphere of influence 
as implausible. But the alternative principle of respect elaborated by Ruggie 
similarly fails, I suggest,  to provide adequate guidance as to the class of persons 
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to whom a corporation may owe positive duties to support and respect human 
rights. The principle of respect is expressed first in terms of impact in relation to 
the capacities in which a corporation might variously act (Ruggie gives the 
examples of corporate activities as producer, service provider, employer and 
neighbour),43 thus assuming obligations only in respect of a class of parties 
specifically and previously defined by contractual relationships or, at most, by 
geographic proximity. Applying Ruggie’s principle to his example, the principle of 
respect as a component of the due diligence requirement would be limited to 
business impacts in relation respectively to consumers, clients, employees and 
neighbours.  
 
By limiting the principle of respect to the impacts of a corporation’s business 
activities, Ruggie’s formulation of the principle excludes, for example, members 
of the general population of a region or country with whom a corporation has no 
specific business relationship or connection, and on whom a company’s business 
activities have no impact.  
 
In so far as Ruggie’s principle of respect requires a consideration of whether a 
corporation might contribute to abuse through relationships connected with 
business activities, this similarly presupposes obligations only in respect of a 
class of persons with whom a relationship established through business activity 
already exists. Ruggie gives the examples of business partners, suppliers, state 
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agencies, and other non-state actors, suggesting that relationships with these 
and similar actors ought to be scrutinised for contributory abuse, or even 
complicity.  
 
Again, the assumption here is that it is only relationships based on contractual 
obligation, engagement with regulatory bodies and other forms of business 
activity that are significant, and that only in relationships thus defined does a 
corporation have any influence over, or at least any responsibility for, harm-
causers. Ruggie’s principle of respect would, for example, impose no duty to aid 
on a corporation that does business in a state in which an oppressive regime is in 
government, where the corporation does no business and thus has no 
relationship with that government. Surely it would not be too much to expect of a 
corporation to intervene, for example, on behalf of persons with whom it has a 
relationship (say, a minority community living in an area in which a corporation 
conducts business and that is the target of particularly oppressive measures) by 
using whatever influence over the government that it may have (perhaps the 
threat of disinvestment, here a positive action), thus coming to the community’s 
aid? 
 
Ruggie’s principle of respect for human rights and its due diligence component 
therefore at once rejects a spatial metaphor for sphere of influence but at the 
same time, establishes obligations that recall fundamental elements of that 
model. Although the principle of respect does not posit linear relationships to 
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define the beneficiaries of moral obligation, it imposes constraints on the basis of 
impacts and relationships that appear to be inherently aligned with contractual 
ties and geographic proximity.  Prima facie at least, the beneficiaries of a duty to 
aid may have no contractual dealings with a corporation, nor may they be 
neighbours.  Like the spatial model, the principle of respect therefore constitutes 
an implausible account of the beneficiaries of a positive duty to aid.  
 
To develop an alternative account of sphere of influence that accounts both for 
the beneficiaries of aid, I draw on Lippke’s SNA. Lippke distinguishes an abstract 
individual’s conception of moral agency (AIA), which conceives of moral agents 
independently of their concrete social, political and economic relations, from the 
social contract approach to business ethics, the SCA.44 He rejects both the AIA 
and the SCA, the latter on the basis of traditional objections to founding moral 
obligation in social contracts, i.e.,  the absence of any actual or implicit contract 
and the absence of any express or implied consent. Lippke raises the further 
objection that the SCA necessarily reduces moral responsibility to common 
denominator terms, and disregards differentials in power, influence and ability. 
 
Some who support the SCA, Lippke suggests, are aware of that many 
corporations have access to resources, power and technology that any account 
of business’s moral responsibility should not ignore.45 Latching onto this concern, 
Lippke develops the SNA as an alternative account of the limits of business 
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moral responsibility. The SNA is based on Kantian notions of respect for the 
freedom and autonomy of individuals, and recognises that all persons have a 
social niche, defined as a “set of concrete social, economic, political, and 
historical relations to other persons.”46 The importance of the SNA for a positive 
duty to aid other persons is that it recognises differentials in power, influence and 
ability, and tailors an agent’s moral responsibilities accordingly.47 Lippke 
summarises the SNA as follows: 
 
According to the SNA, it is usually a mistake to conceive of persons 
abstractly in attempting to delineate their moral responsibilities. Persons 
always have a social niche, that is, a set of concrete social, economic, 
political, and historical relations to other persons. In a variety of ways, and 
with varying magnitudes, these relations determine persons’ abilities to 
affect others’ lives and interests … The SNA fastens on relevant 
differentials in power, influence, and ability, and tailors an agent’s moral 
responsibilities accordingly … In other words, the SNA spells out the 
theoretical underpinnings of the notion that increased power brings with it 
increased responsibility, but without the grounding that increased 
responsibility in consent. Building on the normative moral principles of the 
AIA (namely, principles requiring respect for the freedom and autonomy of 
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individuals), the SNA draws attention to the real world of concretized 
agents that the AIA ignores.48 
 
The social niche of agents determines what constraints are applicable to their 
decisions and actions. This requires an empirical investigation in each case of an 
agent’s social niche, so that responsibility is not determined independently of that 
niche or by reference, as a social contract- based theory of business ethics 
would demand, to any lowest common denominator terms.49  
 
For example, a corporation might make decisions about when and where to 
invest or engage in business activity, decisions that profoundly affect indigenous 
populations. In these circumstances, Lippke suggests that the SNA, requiring as 
it does consideration of the range of options open to persons affected by the 
decision as well as their ability to execute rational life-plans, obligates a 
corporation to support any framework of public policy directed at minimising the 
adverse effects of a decision that a corporation takes in its self-interest.50 
Similarly, the historical dimensions of a corporation’s social niche obligate it, 
when contemplating the closure of a plant, to take into account the interests of 
any local community and to consider any symbiotic relationship that may have 
developed between the corporation and the local community.51  
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This account of relationship and obligation, drawing attention as it does to social, 
economic, political and historical relations to other persons, provides a sound 
conceptual basis for developing an alternative conception of sphere of influence 
that more plausibly defines the beneficiaries of a positive duty to protect human 
rights. 
 
3. 
 
I have taken for granted that corporations have negative obligations to do no 
harm, and positive obligations to protect human rights. In this section, drawing on 
the SNA, I develop the argument that the beneficiaries of a duty to aid are to be 
identified by reference to a corporation’s social niche – i.e., those with whom it 
has a set of concrete social, economic, political and historical relations. This 
implies, in contrast to the a priori assumptions made by the spatial metaphor and 
Ruggie’s appeal to the principle of respect within a scope of due diligence, that it 
is inappropriate to characterise responsibilities in relation to the beneficiaries of a 
duty to aid independently of an empirical investigation of a corporation’s social 
niche.52  
 
What counts is the set of a corporation’s relationships within which it has the 
ability to affect the lives and interests of others. The contours of a positive duty to 
protect human rights are therefore those relationships in respect of which a 
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corporation has the capacity to act in a way that affects the freedom and 
autonomy of others. Beneficiaries of a duty to protect human rights thus defined 
would obviously include those stakeholders acknowledged by the spatial model 
and Ruggie’s scope of due diligence – there is an obvious overlapping of the 
beneficiaries that each approach would admit. For example, a corporation clearly 
has the capacity to act in ways that affect the autonomy and freedom of 
employees, a group of beneficiaries central to the spatial model and to Ruggie’s 
principle of respect. Similarly, the supporters of all of these approaches would in 
most cases contend that communities in an area in which a corporation does 
business ought, in some circumstances at least, to rank as beneficiaries of the 
duty to aid. 
 
The difference is that an approach rooted in the SNA, such as that developed 
here, makes no a priori assumptions about the nature of relationships or their 
fullness. Rather, it latches more concretely onto a corporation’s position of power 
and influence and in particular, its capacity to affect the freedom and autonomy 
of others. It is a corporation’s capacity to make decisions about where to invest 
(or disinvest), for example, that affects a corporation’s employees and their 
security of employment in morally significant ways, rather than merely the 
contractual ties between them and the corporation. Similarly, given the historical 
dimensions and symbiotic nature of a relationship with a local community from 
which employees are recruited, a corporation’s decision about investment would 
materially affect that community, thus qualifying the community as a beneficiary 
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of the positive duty to aid.53  Considerations only of neighbourliness, which the 
spatial model and Ruggie’s principle of respect regard as determinative in these 
circumstances, are an inadequate basis on which to establish a duty to aid since 
they fail to account for the historical and other dynamics of the relationship 
between a corporation and communities located in areas where it conducts 
business activities.  
 
The application of this conception of sphere of influence developed here is best 
appreciated by further illustrative examples. Given the nature of the relationship 
that generally pertains between a corporation and persons with whom it contracts 
for supplies, a corporation has often has the capacity to act in a way that would 
secure the freedom and autonomy of its suppliers’ employees. Corporations 
typically have power and influence over parties bidding for its business, and are 
often in a bargaining position that is sufficiently strong to enable them effectively 
to determine the terms of the contract. In these circumstances, a corporation 
makes decisions that will affect the freedom and autonomy of the supplier’s 
employees. If the corporation does not insist on contractual terms that require a 
supplier to guarantee that the conditions of employment of its employees meet 
international human rights standards, the employees’ ability to form and execute 
rational life plans may be threatened by their resulting conditions of work.  A 
corporation is therefore obligated to ensure, in its contractual arrangements, that 
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its suppliers treat their employees with internationally accepted human rights 
standards.54 
 
Corporations (and MNE’s in particular) often have the capacity to act in ways that 
may affect the freedom and autonomy of citizens more generally. For example, a 
corporation may contract with a government in a developing country to undertake 
a particular project, e.g., to operate a nuclear power station. The corporation has 
the capacity to act in ways that would affect the freedom and autonomy of 
persons beyond the immediate community, including the country’s citizens, in 
relation to their rights to a safe environment. Citizens would be therefore be 
entitled to benefit from a positive duty to aid, at least in the form of safe working 
practices and the exercise of the required degree of diligence to secure all that is 
necessary to ensure the safe operation of the facility.  
 
The nuclear power station example is easily capable of extension to future 
persons.  It is self-evident that the autonomy and freedom of future persons 
would be affected by the acts of a corporation in these circumstances, since their 
health and life prospects might be impaired depending on whether the 
corporation acted actively to promote a safe working environment. This is a 
category of beneficiaries that neither the spatial model nor Ruggie’s principle of 
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respect would acknowledge, predicated as they are on contractual relationships 
and proximity.  
 
Concrete relations with other persons may also give rise to a claim against 
corporations by third parties who have relationships with those others. For 
example, a corporation’s concrete relations with other employers may give rise to 
a claim for aid by the employees of those employers.  If, for example, two 
corporations are linked by a set of social and economic relationships (say, 
through common membership of organisations promoting commercial, trade or 
employer interests) one corporation may have the capacity to act in ways to 
promote the freedom and autonomy of the other’s employees by lobbying for 
generally applicable fair labour standards, or seeking to ensure that fair labour 
standards are applied throughout the sector in which the corporation does 
business. 
 
Concrete relations with governments may give rise to a claim for aid by the 
general population. If, for example, a corporation has an economic or political 
relationship (or both) with a particular government, and  that government 
engages in acts of human rights abuse against the population generally (say, by 
engaging in acts of political censorship, or denying freedom of movement)  the 
corporation’s capacity to act so as to improve the autonomy and freedom of the 
general populace (if only by intervening on their behalf or exercising any leverage 
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it might have against government) would rank the general population as a 
beneficiary of aid.  
 
While the concept of the social niche gives rise to a greater number of 
beneficiaries than that contemplated by other approaches, it also draws limits. 
Where a corporation has no concrete relations with another, it cannot act, in 
respect of that other, in ways that would give rise to any positive obligation. 
Assuming that a corporation had no relationship (politically, historically, 
economically or otherwise) with a government that engaged in human rights 
abuses nor with any other party that might have a relationship connecting it to the 
abuse, those oppressed by the abuse would not rank as the beneficiaries of aid.  
For example, a corporation that does no business in Myanmar, has no 
relationship with the regime in that country or with any other party that might 
connect it to that country, is not expected to aid the victims of human rights 
abuse there – it would be commendable for the corporation to protest against 
human rights abuse in Myanmar, but it would not owe a positive duty to protect 
the citizens of that country. 
 
In short, a conception of sphere of influence grounded in those relationships in 
respect of which a corporation is capable of acting in ways that affect the 
freedom and autonomy of others, both accounts for concrete relationships 
between parties and recognises the dynamic nature of relationships between 
corporations and others. It does not suffer from the implausibility of models 
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based on a priori relationships, nor does it make assumptions about the nature or 
fullness of those relationships  
 
4.  
 
It might be objected that my conception of a sphere of influence would demand of 
corporations, in Sorrel’s words, to forsake commercial purposes and become “full 
time warriors in a moral crusade?” 55 The objection, in more specific terms, is that 
if a corporation were obligated in the terms for which I have argued (i.e., that an 
obligation to support and respect human rights within a corporation’s sphere of 
influence is dependent on relationships in respect of which a corporation has the 
capacity to act so as to affect the freedom and autonomy of others), the 
corporation would go out of business. This objection resonates with Ruggie’s 
concern about the demandingness of positive duties to protect human rights, and 
his concern, in relation specifically to influence as leverage, that “can implies 
ought”.  
 
To be clear, an objection cast in these terms is not to raise the stockholder 
argument that it is inappropriate for business managers to utilise corporate 
resources to pursue social causes – rather, it suggests that while corporations 
may be obligated to others for human rights purposes, they should not be 
constrained to act in a way that would cause them to be so overburdened by 
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moral demands on their time and resources to the extent that their commercial 
purpose is overwhelmed.   
 
I concede that my conception of sphere of influence identifies a broad range of 
beneficiaries, and therefore may impose considerable burdens on corporations, 
especially in locations where there has been a failure of government.  However, 
to ask a corporation to act positively to support and respect human rights within 
its sphere of influence is not to require that it abandons its commercial purpose 
or pay any less attention to it, nor to bear burdens that are not shared by others. 
The moral burdens imposed by a sphere of influence defined in terms of the SNA 
are no more burdensome than those ordinarily placed on individual persons - it 
demands that the corporation assume responsibility for human rights in the same 
way as any private agent. 
 
Further, the conception of sphere of influence for which I have argued does not 
demand obligations independently of an empirical investigation into the 
corporation’s social niche – the scope of obligation is thus calibrated to account 
not only for power and influence, but also for ability, where ability is a function of 
the corporation’s need to remain competitive. Lippke recognises this limitation: 
he concedes that any plausible ethical theory will restrict the range of agents’ 
affirmative duties so as not to overburden them with moral demands on their time, 
energy and resources.56 Sphere of influence properly conceived does not require 
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a corporation to meet the challenges posed by all victims of human rights abuse, 
wherever they might be in the world. The requirements of concrete relationships 
with others and a capacity to act within that context in ways that affect others, 
restricts the range of a corporation’s affirmative duties and imposes realistic 
demands.   
 
Secondly, from an empirical perspective, corporations have increasingly 
integrated support and respect for human rights into their values and business 
plans. I noted in the Introduction that a significant number of MNE’s subscribe to 
the UDHR, and to initiatives such as the Global Compact. This is a clear 
indication that MNE’s acknowledge obligations to support and respect the human 
rights of those affected by their activities, and to do so in terms of universal 
standards. There is also evidence that corporations are engaging increasingly in 
initiatives to promote the realisation of human rights. The trend is against the 
objectors. To respect and support human rights within the sphere of influence is 
not to ask corporations to abandon the business of doing business; rather, 
positive obligations to aid identified beneficiaries (such as those, in Microsoft’s 
Unlimited Potential initiative who lack access to information technology and 
technological skills)57 is very much seen as a part of doing business, and a part 
of the cost of doing business.  In this respect, the positive duty to protect human 
rights and the demands posed by the beneficiaries of that duty are not unique or 
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any more burdensome than other demands made on a corporation in the normal 
course of business.  
 
A second objection might go to relationship. It might be objected that the variety 
of ways in which relationships and the capacity to act to affect the lives of others 
are of no consequence – what counts is only the power that corporations have 
over the lives of others, and how corporations use or have the potential to use 
that power. The beneficiaries of a positive duty to aid, on this account, would 
extend beyond those persons with whom a corporation has some relationship as 
conceived by the SNA, to include people who are in most need. 
 
This assertion is commonly made by business ethicists who argue that the notion 
of corporate global citizenship requires that corporations are citizens of the global 
society; a theory of citizenship that asserts that to be a “citizen” is both a privilege 
and a right and typically carries accompanying duties to citizens globally. 58 
Some have gone farther to suggest that corporations are quasi-government 
institutions, and that they have positive and extensive duties to defined 
beneficiaries, wherever they might be in the world, on that basis. Florian 
Wettstein, for example, argues that the concept of global citizenship is limited 
and misleading - the influence of MNE’s has shifted from the economic to the 
political, both on account of specific interaction with citizens (which he argues 
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have taken on a political character) and also on account of MNE’s growing 
representation within international political bodies, which causes them to “tread 
genuinely political ground”. On this basis, Wettstein implies an obligation on 
corporations to meet claims for a decent world society. This implies that 
corporations are obliged to aid a broad range of beneficiaries, for example, 
persons who lack basic shelter and experience shortages of water, food and 
medicine, wherever they might be in the world.59 Broadly speaking, these are the 
same persons who are beneficiaries of the state’s duty to protect human rights. 
 
Corporations, and especially MNE’s, may well have vast assets and wield 
extensive economic and political power, sometimes exceeding those of some 
states, and they may well be in a position to aid the broad group of beneficiaries 
identified by Wettstein. But to require corporations to act as a surrogate for the 
state in relation to those persons who have legitimate claims against the state, 
not only permits governments to abrogate their human rights responsibilities, it 
overvalues the relevance of power and wealth. Sorrel elaborates on three 
reasons why positive obligations in relation to human rights should not be 
ascribed to corporations only because they are rich and powerful. First, it is not 
necessary to be rich and powerful to discharge many human rights obligations. 
Second, not all corporations run the same risks of violating human rights or are 
faced with challenges or unpromising environments in the conduct of their 
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business. Thirdly, a particularly prescient point, corporations that are rich and 
powerful now can suffer losses and collapse later, and it cannot be said that by 
doing so, they surrender their human rights obligations.60 If, as Sorrel 
demonstrates, positive obligations do not derive merely from wealth and power, 
the arguments that corporations have human rights obligations to aid wherever 
people are in most need, if they can, are flawed.  Relationship, as envisaged by 
the sphere of influence, remains a more plausible basis on which to define the 
beneficiaries of aid.  
 
A third objection might focus on the nature of relationship and suggest that all 
that is required to establish a positive duty to protect human rights is a existence 
of what Reader calls a “real connection” i.e., “something between” a corporation 
and another.61 In other words, to the extent that my conception of sphere of 
influence rests on the capacity of corporations to affect the life of another in the 
context of a concrete relationship with a person who is not that other, it ignores 
more direct moral obligations that relationships place on moral agents. Why 
should a corporation not be obligated to employees, for example, simply on 
account of a connection in the form of presence, or the shared institution of 
employment? These and other forms of real connection would more easily 
identify the beneficiaries of aid.  
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I concede that my account of whom should benefit from a positive duty to aid 
would have difficulty dealing with some connections, notably presence. This is 
particularly so in the case of urgency – Reader asserts that if someone collapses 
in front of me, I am obligated to assist by reason of the fact that we are in each 
other’s presence.62 The SNA, focusing as it does on concrete relationships, may 
not recognise a duty to aid in those circumstances. This would have implications, 
for example, in situations where members of a population in an area where a 
corporation does business were threatened with violence by a local militia.  
 
In most cases, I suggest that the concept of sphere of influence that I have 
proposed would be capable of identifying those whose lives and safety were 
threatened as beneficiaries of aid. It is likely that a corporation in these 
circumstances would have a relationship of some kind (perhaps social, historical 
or political) with the militia or some higher political authority, and that the 
corporation would have the capacity to make decisions that would affect the 
freedom and autonomy of those concerned. This would require the corporation to 
intervene in some appropriate way, for example, by persuading the militia to 
cease their actions, or by political intervention at a higher level.  
 
The difficulty with the argument that direct connection establishes moral 
obligation, of course, is that it cannot account for obligation when the relationship 
is indirect. I have demonstrated, for example, that it is plausible for a corporation 
                                                 
62
 Ibid, at p. 372.  
 43 
to ensure in its negotiations with suppliers that they treat their employees’ fairly. 
The supplier’s employees have no direct connection to the corporation, and thus 
on the “direct relationship” approach, would not qualify as beneficiaries of aid. On 
my conception of sphere of influence, the corporation’s concrete economic 
relationship with the supplier and the corporation’s capacity, in the context of that 
relationship, to affect the lives of the supplier’s employees, qualifies them to 
benefit from a positive duty to aid. 
 
Conclusion  
 
I have taken for granted that corporations have negative obligations to do no 
harm, and positive obligations to help protect human rights. The positive duty to 
help protect human rights is a duty that encompasses an obligation to help 
defined beneficiaries. The concept of sphere of influence was introduced in an 
attempt to demarcate corporate responsibilities in relation to human rights from 
those of the state. In the absence of any relationship obviously analogous to that 
between state and citizen (a relationship that defines the scope of state 
obligation), the scope of corporate moral obligation (in particular, the 
beneficiaries of a duty to aid) have not been defined.  The spatial metaphor 
applied to the concept of sphere of influence (a metaphor that resonates strongly 
with the stakeholder model of business ethics) and Ruggie’s more recent 
elaboration of the principle of respect, both provide limited and ultimately 
implausible accounts of sphere of influence in relation to whom a corporation is 
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obligated to aid. The spatial metaphor assumes a priori relationships with defined 
others, and is unclear about whether relationships establish beneficiaries of the 
duty to aid or obligations to exercise influence in relation to human rights in 
particular situations, or both. The principle that requires corporations to respect 
human rights correctly disavows linear relationships with defined beneficiaries as 
the basis of the duty to aid, but implausibly predicates that duty on the limited 
criteria of contractual ties and geographic proximity.  
 
I have argued that a more plausible account of a corporation’s positive duty to 
protect human rights requires an empirical investigation of a corporation’s social 
niche, i.e., its social, economic, political and historical relationships with others. 
The beneficiaries of aid (and the proper sphere of influence in relation to a 
corporation’s responsibility for human rights) are identified by those relationships 
in respect of which a corporation has the capacity to make decisions that affect 
the freedom and autonomy of persons. The scope of beneficiaries thus defined 
would generally include those stakeholders in a linear relationship with a 
corporation and who are acknowledged as beneficiaries by the concept of sphere 
of influence as a spatial metaphor, as well as those identified as beneficiaries by 
the application of Ruggie’s principle of respect, i.e. corporation’s neighbours and 
those with whom it has contractual ties. But the proper sphere of influence in 
relation to corporate responsibility for human rights must necessarily account for 
positions of power and influence, concrete relationships between corporations 
and others (all of which are similarly dynamic) and the capacity by a corporation 
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within the confines of those relationships to affect the freedom and autonomy of 
others. This does not imply that corporations are morally required to forsake 
commercial purposes to assist all victims of human rights abuse, nor does it 
imply that corporations are required to assume obligations that properly ought to 
remain those of the state. A proper sphere of influence in relation to corporate 
responsibility for human rights calibrates the scope of a duty to aid by reference 
to power, influence and ability.  
 
The scope of this paper has necessarily been limited - other dimensions of the 
duty to aid - for example, what a corporation is obligated to do and how much a 
corporation is obligated to do to aid beneficiaries (i.e. to what extent is obligation 
dependent on available remedies and existing capacity?), and which rights are 
relevant to determining a corporation’s duties, (i.e. are there distinctive rights 
relative to the sphere of operation of a corporation?) are issues that should be 
explored in further research. 
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